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Microfinance and the business of poverty reduction:  Critical perspectives from 
rural Bangladesh 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we provide a critical analysis of the role of market-based approaches to poverty 
reduction in developing countries. In particular we analyze the role of microfinance in 
poverty alleviation by conducting an ethnographic study of three villages in Bangladesh. 
Microfinance has become an increasingly popular approach that aims to alleviate poverty by 
providing the poor new opportunities for entrepreneurship. It also aims to promote 
empowerment (especially among women) while enhancing social capital in poor communities. 
Our findings, however, provide a different narrative. We found microfinance led to 
increasing levels of indebtedness among already impoverished communities and exacerbated 
economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities. Our findings contribute to the emerging 
literature on the role of social capital in developing entrepreneurial capabilities in poor 
communities by recounting narratives from voices that tend to be excluded in the debate on 
inclusive growth.   
 
Keywords:  Microfinance, NGOs, poverty reduction, social capital, 
vulnerability  
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Microfinance and the business of poverty reduction:  Critical perspectives from 
rural Bangladesh 
 ‘Grameen Foundation helps the world’s poorest, especially women, improve their lives and escape 
poverty by helping to provide access to appropriate financial services new ways to generate 
income……By helping local microfinance institutions and other poverty-focused organizations 
become more effective we’ve helped millions pull  themselves out of poverty’ (Grameen Foundation, 
2012). 
 
‘Nothing can stop an idea whose time has gone. And micro-finance is in a danger zone. It is a 
discredited model. It has raised more questions that it has answered. To think that we are going 
to alleviate poverty is a tall claim.  Microfinance has promised more than it has actually 
delivered, created more problems than actually solved and continues to promise much more than 
what it actually puts on the ground’ (Jairam Ramesh, Indian Rural Development Minister, 
2012). 
 
Introduction 
Poverty is big business.  Even in the United States, one of the richest countries in the 
world, the poverty industry is worth about $33 billion a year comprising payday loan centers, 
pawnshops, credit card companies and microfinance providers who generate business from 
the poorer segments of the population (Rivlin, 2010).  Amongst the so-called developing and 
least developed countries millions of people continue to face crippling poverty.  ‘Ending 
poverty in all its forms everywhere’ is the first of 17 Sustainable Development Goals set by the 
United Nations.  In absolute terms at the global level there are currently between 1.2 and 1.5 
billion people still living in extreme poverty and 162 million children still suffering from 
chronic under-nutrition, a figure the UN deems ‘unacceptable’ (UNDP, 2014). 
Microfinance, or the provision of small loans to the poor with the aim of lifting them 
out of poverty, is a key poverty reduction strategy that has spread rapidly and widely over the 
last twenty years, currently operating in more than 60 countries (Bateman, 2010).  According 
to many researchers and policy makers microfinance encourages entrepreneurship, increases 
income generating activity thus reducing poverty, empowers the poor (especially women in 
developing countries), increases access to health and education, and builds social capital 
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among poor and vulnerable communities (Khandker, 2005; Westover, 2008).  Studies of 
market-based measures to alleviate poverty are also gaining considerable traction in the 
management literature where scholars have developed concepts like ‘base-of-pyramid’ and 
‘creating shared value’ to address what businesses can do to alleviate poverty and enhance 
social welfare (Porter and Kramer, 2011; Prahalad, 2004).    
However, more recently concerns have been raised about the real value and impact of 
microfinance.  In the last few years ‘microfinance meltdowns’ have been reported in 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Bosnia, Mexico and Lebanon, and most dramatically in the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh when the entire microfinance industry collapsed in late 2010, 
which was the context of the quote by the then Indian minister mentioned above (Bateman & 
Chang, 2012).  More disturbingly, inability to repay microfinance loans has also been linked 
to ‘hundreds of suicides’ among borrowers in India (Associated Press, 2012) and organ 
trafficking in Bangladesh (BBC, 2013).  Such concerns raise important questions: does 
microfinance enable entrepreneurship among impoverished communities that can lift them 
out of poverty?  Is it possible as some critics claim, that microfinance instead of alleviating 
poverty actually serves to exacerbate poverty in particular contexts (Bateman, 2010; Karim, 
2008)?  If so, how?  How do the receivers or ‘clients’ of microfinance cope with rising debts 
that result from incurring microfinance loans?  And how does group borrowing influence 
social relations between individuals in the group? 
To help answer these questions, we report the results of an ethnographic study of 
microfinance in three villages in rural Bangladesh that have been targeted by microfinance 
organizations aiming to reduce poverty in the region by promoting entrepreneurial activity.  
Our results challenge existing theory and research regarding the role and impact of 
microfinance - that it generates income, empowers women and builds social capital in poor 
communities.  Our aim in this paper is to change the conversation about microfinance and 
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market-based development by changing the lens through which the problem of poverty 
reduction programs is seen: not from the perspective of the providers of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) or the many government and non-government organizations (NGOs) that 
develop and implement microfinance initiatives but from the perspective of the receivers of 
microfinance, especially those that live in extreme poverty.   
Our study makes three contributions to the literature.  First, at the individual level we 
provide an empirically grounded narrative about the lived realities of poverty and describe 
the experience of poor communities with microfinance.  Our ethnographic study enables us 
to develop a grounded theory of the vulnerability dimensions of poverty.  The majority of the 
literature on microfinance has focused on the supply side of the equation.  Research questions 
have tended to be donor driven and the emphasis has been on the reach of microfinance 
initiatives (Mosley and Hulme, 1998), the high repayment rates on microloans (Matin et al., 
2002), the role of NGOs in implementing microfinance projects (Baruah, 2010), the kinds of 
microenterprises that emerge (Datar et al., 2008) and the organizational processes of 
microfinance providers (Galema et al., 2012).  We narrate a different story in this paper: a 
story of how microfinance affects the daily grind of the rural poor, the choices they have to 
make to stay financially afloat and the economic, environmental and social consequences of 
these choices.  Such rich empirical accounts are rarely found in the literature, especially from 
developing regions such as Bangladesh where access can be difficult.  Much of the rhetoric of 
‘empowerment’ is from a top down perspective of those that do the empowering with little or 
no attention being paid to the increased vulnerabilities faced by those living in extreme 
poverty arising from market based poverty reduction initiatives like microfinance.  Our study 
provides such a bottom up perspective.     
Second, findings from our study contribute to the literature on the role of social capital 
in poverty reduction.  Emerging research on base-of-pyramid (BoP) approaches to poverty 
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reduction and empowerment of poor populations suggests that market based initiatives 
directed at impoverished communities can leverage their social capital to develop capabilities 
that could lift them out of poverty (Ansari et al., 2012).  Our study identifies the boundary 
conditions of social capital creation through market based initiatives by highlighting processes 
whereby social capital can be undermined by market-based measures like microfinance.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on building inclusive markets by recounting 
narratives from voices that tend to be excluded in the debate on inclusive growth at the 
institutional level.  NGOs are key actors that fill the ‘institutional voids’ in rural areas of 
developing countries (Mair et al., 2012) and our study complements emerging research in the 
area by problematizing the role of NGOs as institutional agents of poverty alleviation (Khan 
et al., 2010).  In the sections that follow we discuss the emergence of microfinance and 
examine its theoretical basis as a poverty reduction strategy.  We then describe our 
ethnographic study of communities in three Bangladeshi villages and analyze their 
experiences of microfinance.  We conclude by discussing implications of our findings and 
providing directions for future research.  
 
Poverty and vulnerability 
 
While there is no universally accepted definition of poverty, economic dimensions of 
poverty based on income and consumption data have generally been used to measure poverty 
levels.  For instance, the World Bank defines two thresholds of poverty – the ‘extreme poor’ 
who live on less than $1.25 a day and the merely ‘poor’ who live on less than $2 a day based 
on consumption per capita (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).  While the dollar a day figure may be 
a useful heuristic for researchers and policy makers it does not capture the lived realities of the 
poor – feelings of powerlessness and vulnerability risks for example, or poor nutrition and 
health arising from sustained deprivation, or gender differences in poverty (Chakravarti, 
2006; Ravallion, 2003).  Economic measures of poverty may reflect the structural aspects of 
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poverty but do not capture the cultural, social and psychological dimensions of poverty and 
more importantly precludes any kind of agency to the poor by ignoring their survival 
strategies, social relations, and practices of resistance (Arora and Romijn, 2012). 
 Some studies have identified qualitative indicators of poverty such as vulnerability, 
deprivation, helplessness, and deficiency that arise from income poverty and the inability of 
the poor to leverage resources required to fulfill their basic needs (Bradshaw, 2007; 
Chambers, 1995; Chakravarti, 2006).  However, apart from offering estimates of the number 
of people living on $1 or $2 a day research assessing the effectiveness of poverty alleviation 
measures does not provide useful insights into the lived experiences of the chronic poor or the 
effectiveness of poverty alleviation strategies in reducing the qualitative aspects of poverty 
such as vulnerability, deprivation and helplessness.  Our study attempts to address this gap.  
Our analysis provides a fresh perspective of poverty and poverty reduction strategies by 
exploring an expansive concept of chronic poverty that takes into account feelings of 
vulnerability and associated risks experienced by the extreme poor.  Drawing from the extant 
literature, we define poverty as a process whereby people are subject to sustained physical, 
social, economic, political, psychological and/or spiritual deprivation which gives rise to any 
combination of physical weakness, perceived isolation, and feelings of ill-being, vulnerability 
and powerlessness (Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Chakravarti 2006; Chambers 1995; Ravallion 
2002). 
Vulnerability has been conceptualized in the literature in a number of ways.  In the 
economics and development literatures vulnerability is defined as the ‘probability of risk 
today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper poverty’ (World Bank, 2012b). Thus, 
vulnerability is the probability of experiencing a future loss in welfare and the prospect of 
individuals or households becoming poor in the future or the prospect of continuing to be 
poor if they are currently living in poverty (Christiaensen and Subbarao, 2005; Zhang and 
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Wan, 2006).  Vulnerability to income shocks along with deprivations in health and nutrition 
can be considered to be part of an expanded poverty concept (Morduch, 1994).  The World 
Bank identified vulnerability as an ‘important consideration for poverty reduction policies’ 
because vulnerability risks influence household behavior and coping strategies.  
Vulnerability is a more dynamic concept than poverty in the sense that it describes 
processes and events that lead populations to fall in and out of poverty.  Moser (1998: 3) 
defines vulnerability as ‘insecurity and sensitivity in the well-being of individuals, households 
and communities in the face of a changing environment’.  The decline in welfare can result 
from several causes: natural disasters, environmental damage, economic shocks or social and 
political exclusion.  Vulnerable populations also differ in their resilience to risks and their 
capabilities to manage risks are constrained by their inability to earn a living as well as by the 
social and psychological effects of deprivation and exclusion (Moser, 1998: 4).  In the context 
of poverty, vulnerability can be policy induced (for example increased risks arising from 
government imposed austerity measures) or market induced (for example, rising indebtedness 
as a result of increased borrowing (Glewwe and Hall, 1998).  Vulnerability is also related to 
asset ownership: people with more assets are less vulnerable and loss of assets leads to greater 
vulnerabilities.   
In his influential work on development Sen (1983; 1985) argued that poverty 
reduction strategies should focus on developing capabilities among the poor to enable them to 
leverage economic opportunities.  Poverty has less to do with utility or choice but is seen as 
deprivation of capabilities to participate in economic activity or political processes.  How the 
poor can develop the capabilities required to escape poverty is of course a significant 
challenge.  Prevailing economic wisdom argues that asset accumulation and access to capital 
are key factors in developing capabilities among the poor (De Soto, 2003).  The popularity of 
market led approaches to poverty reduction such as microfinance and base of pyramid 
 	 8	
strategies rests on the assumption that these strategies can deliver the required capabilities. 
Ansari et al. (2012) argue that leveraging the social capital that exists in poor communities 
may enable them to build the capabilities needed to access resources from external groups or 
institutions.  They argue that a BoP approach has the potential to both retain existing social 
capital in impoverished communities while enhancing their social capital through accessing 
resources from external networks and groups.  However, there is little empirical research that 
supports this assumption.   
 
Poverty and social capital 
While poor communities lack economic assets and financial capital, their social 
relations play a key role in sustaining their livelihoods.  Rural communities in subsistence 
economies are often characterized by norms of collectivity, reciprocity, sharing of community 
resources and extended kinship ties that are essential for their survival (Scott, 1976).  There is 
some evidence that suggests communities with strong social networks are better able to deal 
with poverty and vulnerability (Moser, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).  These networks 
generate social capital, which reflects the general goodwill and resources that arise from 
networks of relationships in a community (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Putnam, 1993).  Social 
capital is a multidimensional concept comprising of structural, relational and cognitive 
components (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  Network configurations and associations 
constitute structural social capital. Networks and ties are fostered through communication 
and shared meanings, which constitute cognitive social capital.  Relational social capital refers 
to the extent of trust, reciprocity and cooperation between individuals in a network.    
Putnam (1993) also distinguished between two types of social capital – bonding social 
capital, which is characterized by horizontal relationships based on reciprocity, trust, shared 
norms, values and beliefs that promote solidarity between individuals within a network 
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enabling them to ‘get by’; and bridging social capital, which reflects the ability of individuals in a 
network to gain privileged access to resources and information from external networks in an 
attempt to ‘get ahead’ (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).  Many poor rural communities face 
difficulties in accessing resources from external groups because they do not possess adequate 
bridging social capital.  The problem is compounded in developing countries where the state 
is often unable to provide resources and opportunities to impoverished populations.  
Emerging research suggests that non-state actors and institutions can fill the void left by the 
state to promote business ventures and entrepreneurship that would empower these ‘BoP 
communities’ by enhancing their social capital and enabling them to escape the poverty trap  
(Ansari et al., 2012; London, 2009; Mair and Martí, 2009). 
BoP advocates argue that microfinance can deliver economic development and social 
empowerment by creating bridging social capital that allows impoverished individuals to 
access external resources and networks.  However, due to structurally unequal power 
relationships between finance providers and borrowers microfinance can also create new 
dependencies on external institutions while adversely impacting social relationships of trust 
and reciprocity thus eroding bonding social capital (Ansari et al., 2012).  Moreover, BoP 
approaches to poverty alleviation lack sufficient theoretical development and empirical 
support.  Critics have questioned the role of business in poverty alleviation arguing that BoP 
approaches continue to be informed by win-win assumptions that privilege business rather 
than enhance social welfare of BoP communities (Karnani, 2007), obscure unequal power 
relations (Arora and Romijn, 2011) and serve to depoliticize the economic sphere by 
advocating solely market based measures to alleviate poverty (Banerjee, 2008).  Market based 
approaches such as entrepreneurship and BoP ventures are a reflection of particular 
rationalities that are based on ideological assumptions of individualism and choice that are 
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sometimes incompatible in communities characterized by sharing, reciprocity, kinship ties 
and collectivism (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Ansari et al., 2012).  
 From its humble beginnings in the late 1970s and early 1980s in rural Bangladesh 
microfinance today is a global multi-billion dollar industry.  The United Nations declared 
2005 as the ‘International Year of Microcredit’ calling for ‘constructing inclusive financial 
sectors that strengthen the powerful, but often untapped, entrepreneurial spirit that exists all 
over the world and a new wave of micro entrepreneurship, giving poor and low-income 
people a chance to build better lives’ (United Nations, 2004).  The Grameen Bank, formally 
established in 1983 was the first organizational entity to offer collateral-free microcredit to the 
poor based on early experiments with providing small low-interest loans by its founder Dr 
Muhammad Yunus.  These early experiments of providing microcredit to the poor resulted in 
two intriguing findings: first, the repayment rate was exceptionally high despite the cash poor 
clientele and second, women proved to be significantly better at repaying than men (Yunus, 
1999).  Further investigation revealed that one of the reasons for high repayment was access 
to family and community networks to repay loans.  A key driver in repayment was 
reputational damage and bringing ‘shame’ to the family (Bateman, 2010).  Reliance on family 
and community networks for repayment led to another innovation – the creation of ‘solidarity 
circles’ (kendra) where groups of women rather than individuals would be responsible for 
‘helping’ an individual to repay loans if the borrower was facing financial hardships.  Thus, 
the ‘social’ entered the microfinance discourse in the form of social capital, or more 
accurately ‘social collateral’ (Bateman, 2010).          
 Proponents of microfinance claimed that offering credit to poor communities would 
provide a source of additional income and employment as well as access to low interest loans, 
enabling poor communities to escape from the clutches of local moneylenders and loan sharks 
and their exorbitant interest rates.  The availability of financial services to poor segments of 
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the population could help them deal with vulnerabilities arising from poverty, while 
empowering women who could find few business opportunities because of patriarchal systems 
of control.  Finally, microfinance could help build social capital and solidarity in 
impoverished communities because microfinance institutions promoted group lending and 
were willing to accept ‘social solidarity’ as collateral (Bateman, 2010; Matin et al, 2002).  
 Despite scores of reports and scholarly papers addressing the impact of microfinance, 
no clear picture emerges about either the sustainability of microfinance institutions or its 
impact on poverty alleviation (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005).  While some studies claim 
that microfinance increased disposable income and enabled poor families to move out of 
poverty (Khandker, 2005) other studies found no evidence of such a relationship (Kah et al., 
2005; Morris and Barnes, 2005) and some even found a negative impact (Bateman, 2010; 
Dichter and Harper, 2007; Karim, 2011; Roodman, 2011).  Even the World Bank, a 
powerful proponent of microfinance appears to take a more cautionary stance in recent years, 
concluding that ‘more research is needed to assert whether there is a robust and positive 
relationship between the use of credit and household welfare, including moving out of 
poverty’ (World Bank, 2007: 104).  
 Assessment of the impacts of microfinance reveal mixed findings – both about its 
effectiveness in poverty reduction and about its sustainability as a financial model.  What is 
missing from extant accounts of microfinance is the subjective experience of the poor, 
especially the extreme poor and how they negotiate the everyday grind of poverty, their 
financial decision making process and outcomes, their narratives of vulnerability and 
disempowerment, their experience as clients and users of microfinance, their interactions with 
microfinance providers, and the social and economic outcomes that result.  It is to these 
subjective formations of microfinance that we now turn in an attempt to develop a more 
grounded theoretical approach. 
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Methods 
We adopted a micro level ethnographic approach to understand subjective 
experiences of poverty focusing on individual and household narratives.  Our data collection 
focused on understanding subjective experiences about the qualitative aspects of poverty such 
as feelings of vulnerability, deprivation and helplessness.  We also wanted to understand how 
the availability of microfinance influenced the lives of chronically poor individuals and 
households.  By focusing on the lives of the receivers of microfinance we provide a more 
complex analysis of the experiences and lived realities of poverty than what can be 
understood from household consumption figures, interest rates, repayment rates and loan 
disbursement figures.  Our ethnography involved observations (of borrower meetings), focus 
groups and in-depth interviews and was conducted by two teams of researchers and their 
locally based associates. 
The study setting and sample 
Fieldwork was conducted in three villages in Bangladesh in the Matlab district.  The 
region comprises more than 150 villages and has few roads – access is mainly via small boats.  
Agriculture (mainly rice and jute) and fishing are the two main occupations. Microfinance 
activity in the region dates back to the mid-1990s although there are very few reliable sources 
that document the extent and use of microfinance.  Chronic poverty in the region meant that 
Matlab became a focal point for microfinance programs operated by key NGOs such as the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), Grameen Bank, Association for Social 
Advancement (ASA) and Krishi Bank.  All the individuals and households that constituted 
our sample can be classified as ‘chronically and extreme poor’ based on the $1 and $2 a day 
consumption thresholds.  In 2011 more than 75% of Bangladeshi’s population lived on less 
than $2 a day with 43% living on less than $1.25 a day (World Bank, 2012a).   
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The cultural, social, political and economic landscape of Bangladesh posed significant 
challenges to us as Western researchers and we did our best to ensure that culturally 
constructed rules around distinctive patterns of behavior, norms, values, traditions, laws, and 
customs were taken into account before the sampling process commenced.  For example, we 
engaged with the Matlab district government official and village elders to gain permission to 
visit the villages and collect data.  We visited a number of villages accompanied by local 
leaders who introduced us to the village elders from whom we subsequently obtained 
permission to interview community members to collect research data.  The sampling frame 
adopted for the research included people from three villages in the Matlab district.  Following 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) we selected a theoretical sample to understand subjective 
experiences of microfinance clients.  This process of data collection is ‘controlled by the 
emerging theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 45), rather than the requirements of statistical 
sampling and is consistent with the exploratory and descriptive purpose of the research.  
Data collection was done in three phases across three villages (denoted as A, B and C 
in Table I).  This allowed us to document the experience of borrowers with microfinance over 
time.  A total of 56 in-depth interviews and 6 focus groups were conducted with borrowers 
across three villages during the first two phases.  Consistent with our ethnographic approach, 
two research associates lived in the area for six months immersing themselves in and 
familiarizing with the context whilst conducting interviews and focus groups with villagers.  A 
reflective, progressive ethnographic diary was kept, where incidents and learnings were 
recorded. For example, we observed that women were more likely to communicate freely 
when they were doing their normal daily chores like walking to the well to collect water or 
washing clothes in the river, or sitting together over tea with only other women present; 
whereas the men became more communicative when sitting in the local tea shop after 
finishing work for the day.  We arranged our interviews and discussions with participants in 
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accordance with their daily routines.  Our field diary had more than 150 pages of 
observations, reflections and notes, which we included in our data analysis.    
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I around here 
------------------------------------- 
Data analysis 
The primary purpose of the analysis was to make sense of the themes emerging from 
the ethnographic data, which consisted of transcripts of interviews and focus groups, our 
reflective diary, as well as personal notes and observations.  We followed a two-stage 
approach in analyzing data.  The first stage involved coding the data from the transcripts of 
the interviews and field research notes.  The second-stage involved describing and 
interpreting patterns in the data that emerged from the day-to-day lived reality of the 
research participants and relating the themes that emerged with the literature on 
vulnerabilities and social capital.  Based on our interviews we also developed narratives that 
described the experiences of borrowers throughout the process of loan procurement to 
repayment, how the money was spent and the consequences of non-repayment.  The software 
package Leximancer 4 was used for initial coding of the data.  Leximancer is a data mining 
program that identifies key concepts within the text.  Concept mapping does not merely use 
keywords but represents the data in visual forms by focusing on clusters of related terms and 
their relationships (Smith and Humphreys, 2006).  Leximancer provides a schematic diagram 
that displays five items of information about the text: the main concepts discussed in the 
document set, the relative frequency of each concept, how often concepts co-occur within the 
text, the centrality of each concept, and the similarity in contexts in which the concepts occur.  
The connection between concepts is measured by examining how often two concepts are 
discussed within the same passage of text in order to establish relationships and intra-textual 
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interactivity.  Some initial codes that emerged from Leximancer coding included concepts 
like debt, repayment, NGOs, money, family, income, shame, crops.  We then made sense of 
these themes by relating them to the narratives we had constructed as well as to theoretical 
perspectives from the poverty literature.   
We used an iterative process to infer second order codes and aggregate theoretical 
dimensions (see Figure 1).  For example, in arriving at the dimension of economic 
vulnerability we looked at creating first order codes from an analysis of the transcripts and 
output from the Leximancer data mining software program.  The concept ‘money’ was 
related in varying degrees of strength to other concepts like ‘borrow’, ‘loan’, ‘pay’, ‘NGO’, 
‘family’, ‘debt’, ‘land’, with ‘borrow’, ‘loan’ and ‘debt’ having the maximum co-occurrences 
with ‘money’.  We then searched in our transcripts for references to these concepts from all 
respondents, which allowed us to interpret them as elements of a second order theme that 
reflected rising indebtedness.  Based on these second order themes, we then constructed 
narratives that reflected participants’ experiences of rising indebtedness.  We then went to the 
vulnerability literature where we found references to risks arising from debt, asset loss and 
non-repayment of loans, which helped to validate our empirically developed codes.  We 
returned to our data to find cases where households lost their assets in order to repay loans.  
We followed a similar approach in interpreting themes that reflected social relations.  Based 
on this iterative process we were able to construct second order codes that led to three 
aggregate dimensions of vulnerability: economic vulnerability, social vulnerability and 
environmental vulnerability.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
------------------------------------- 
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Findings 
In giving meaning to the data we drew on theoretical perspectives from the poverty 
literature, particularly qualitative indicators such as vulnerability and social capital.  In 
reading and analyzing the transcripts of our interviews, observations, and focus groups, 
vulnerability and social capital emerged as key themes that described people’s experience of 
poverty.  
 Measuring vulnerability as a probability risk function does not reveal the complexities 
of the phenomenon.  The space of vulnerability comprises both internal and external factors.  
Internal factors include defenselessness, inadequate capacity to mobilize resources to cope 
with hazards, and potentiality, the risks of severe consequences (Watts and Bohle, 1993).  
External factors include risks of exposure to hazards (Chambers, 1989).  Vulnerability does 
not just result from poverty: it can also ‘reinforce the income processes which lead to poverty 
and further diminish the expected welfare of the poor’ (Morduch, 1994: 225).  Our analysis 
reveals the multidimensional nature of vulnerability, in particular the economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of vulnerability.  Our findings indicate that the method of 
distribution and use of microfinance in our research sites, instead of alleviating poverty 
actually served to exacerbate poverty and increase vulnerabilities rather than create 
empowerment for the majority of borrowers. Tables 2, 3 and 4 present data in the form of 
illustrative quotes that describe the heightened vulnerabilities in these communities.  Three 
dimensions of vulnerability emerged from the data: economic, social and environmental 
vulnerabilities as we discuss below. 
 
Economic vulnerability:  One of the indicators of success for microfinance operations is 
its availability and reach.  All the villages and households in our sample had used some form 
of microfinance.  However, as microfinance clients they had little success in escaping from 
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poverty – in fact we found increasing levels of indebtedness as well as loss of assets due to the 
inability of borrowers to repay loans.  There were three major reasons why borrowers were 
unable to repay loans: first, the vast majority of loans were used for consumption smoothing – 
buying food, medicine, and the basic necessities of life rather than for any income generating 
activity.  In our sample only 9% of the loans were used to start a business.  35% of the loans 
were used for agriculture – mainly to grow maize crops as a cash crop. The majority of the 
loans were used for other purposes such as dowry payments, income smoothing, house 
building and repair, and children’s education.  Second, the income generating activity that 
was actively promoted by NGOs and microfinance providers – growing the cash crop maize 
– did not yield the results that were expected mainly due to adverse climatic conditions, high 
input costs of fertilizers and pesticides (which led to increased borrowing and indebtedness) 
and inadequate training.  Third, borrowers took out multiple loans from different 
microfinance providers where one loan was used to repay a previous loan, leading to spiraling 
levels of debt that trapped borrowers.  One borrower described his experience: 
I borrowed 40000 taka from an NGO. I used my mother’s name for this loan. I 
told them my mother will cultivate rice. But the loan helped me to buy food, 
cloth, medicine for children. But I have no earnings to pay it back. I work as a 
daily laborer. Today I earned 300 taka. Gave 250 to my wife. She saves money 
eating leaves and salt, by saving and managing she paid up a loan of 5000 which 
we had taken from another NGO. (FG; R&RA). 
 
Our findings add support to emerging research that suggests poor people are going 
without nourishment in order to pay back microloans (Hammill, et al., 2008).  Microfinance 
loans, while helping smooth income and consumption can exacerbate rather than reduce 
vulnerability because they increase the debt burden of individuals and families.  From our 
observation and discussion it was apparent that heads of households (typically males) were 
under constant pressure and stress to produce enough food for the family.  The farmers’ 
frequent failure to do so gave rise to feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness.  The no 
collateral (or social collateral) policy of microfinance, often heralded as its most innovative 
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aspect, had a darker side when it came to inability to pay: in many cases indebted farmers 
had to sell off their land to pay back the loans exacerbating already high levels of 
vulnerability.  The following quote illustrates increasing levels of economic vulnerability: 
Farmer 3: To tell you the truth, taking loan from NGO is a kind of earning. You 
take loan from one NGO and you start another loan from another NGO, and 
also take loan from relatives. I am a daily laborer which helps me to buy daily 
necessities. I pay the NGO loan from the money taken from relatives because 
they do not take interest. The income comes from delaying the payment. Last 
year I bought roof shed for my house it was taken away by cyclone. So, I had to 
take loan from NGOs. I actually shuffle the loans and somehow pass my days in 
rainy season. Everybody is doing this in rainy season when they have nothing to 
do, but nobody will disclose it to you. (FG; RA) 
 
Table II lists illustrative quotes that reflect economic vulnerability of the households in 
our study. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table II around here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Social vulnerability:  The high levels of perceived risk and vulnerability in the 
communities we studied were significant in shaping their social relations and the solidarity 
circles within extended family groups.  Communities that have strong social networks are 
considered better able to deal with poverty and vulnerability (Narayan, 1999).  Solidarity 
circles consisting of family, friends and associates were a fundamental asset in dealing with 
poverty.  This solidarity was the ‘glue‘ that has held these close-knit family groups together 
and helped them overcome adverse situations, particularly when microfinance debt collectors 
started harassing family members for repayment.  A participant in one of the male focus 
groups, describing a group of 29 microfinance borrowers stated: 
Sometimes those 29 members give money from their pocket to pay the instalment 
of (a family member). When (the family member) see other 29 people are paying 
the money for him, then he become liable, or some kind of obligation. Now the 
loan is not to BRAC, the loan is to 29 individuals. The BRAC people come to 
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you every day and ask you give me the money, you say I don't have money. They 
swear at you, they say bad things to you, you can take that. But when 29 people 
are your family members, key members and neighbours, you just can't play with 
them. (FG; RA) 
 
Our findings indicate that microfinance heightened feelings of social vulnerability 
through processes of surveillance, disempowerment and shaming.  Microfinance innovations 
of ‘social collateral’ and ‘solidarity circles’ while ensuring high repayment rates had negative 
social consequences.  There was increased surveillance within and between groups of 
borrowers leading to a slow erosion of trust and social cohesion, a key component of social 
capital.  Women borrowers fearing default by a group member, engaged in surveillance of 
member behaviour after a loan was taken and since family members were also involved, the 
entire community became a mechanism of surveillance leading to conflicts and discord.  In 
one family the opportunity to borrow relatively large sums of money through microcredit led 
to an abandonment of traditional risk management practices that were rooted in family and 
social ties.  Non-payment of debt led to a breakdown in family structures where one male ran 
away from the village leaving his mother and brother to face the debt collectors.  
Our findings indicate that microfinance did little in terms of promoting women’s 
empowerment and enhancing social welfare.  The availability of microfinance and the 
targeting of women as potential borrowers are changing traditional socio-cultural norms 
where younger women are making their own decisions to borrow money, and also breaking 
purdah rules in order to attend meetings with co-borrowers and microfinance providers.  
While this is a positive outcome, such ‘empowerment’ almost always leads to more 
indebtedness and thus increased levels of vulnerability.  Despite claims by the Grameen Bank 
and NGOs that loans are provided to poor women our findings indicate that typically 
husbands and other male members are the ones that actually use the loans using the women 
as a front.  As one respondent put it: 
 	 20	
Don’t you think the NGOs know our trick, of course they do. They know we are 
using our wives to get loan from them and using these money to buy rice and 
cloths. But it’s a kind of ‘they use us and we use them’. They know we will pay the 
money because we borrow from everywhere. It is our bad nature. We should not 
do this but when your kids and family is hungry you have no other alternatives. (I; 
R&RA) 
 
Such findings are supported by reports from other studies –while Bangladeshi women 
are the primary carriers of NGO loans, men used 95% of the loans (Karim, 2008).  
In rural Bangladesh social and cultural practices are generally organized around 
patriarchal lines and inheritance customs are typically patrilineal.  There are key gender 
differences in work patterns, literacy, education and employment, although there is some 
evidence of changing patterns among young women and girls in recent years as more women 
begin to seek employment outside the home.  These differences were also apparent at the 
three villages in our study where generally the women were required to live fairly secluded 
lives, expected to maintain purdah, and not work outside the house.  While patriarchal systems 
are dominant in rural Bangladesh, the changing social position of women that are 
microfinance clients was evident in our study.  A politics of shame surrounds much of 
microfinance activity when it comes to non-repayment of loans.  Serious defaults have led to 
‘ghar bhanga’ or housebreaking where members of a group loan sell off the defaulting 
member’s house (Karim, 2008).  Public shaming is a particularly effective way to ensure 
repayment and several NGOs resort to these practices, often using state institutions like the 
police and courts to enforce payment.  Typically, the women are blamed for bringing ‘shame’ 
and ‘dishonor’ to the family home although husbands and other males are the primary 
beneficiaries of the loans.  Despite its claims of empowering women, microfinance operates 
very much within a patriarchal system.  
 Our findings indicate another disturbing trend: microfinance loans are increasingly 
being used to make dowry payments.  Payment of joutuk or dowry, where the bride’s family is 
required to give gifts and cash to the groom’s family upon marriage, although technically 
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illegal is widespread (Huda, 2006).  Dowry is a leading cause of violence against women in 
Bangladesh and other countries in the region and impoverished families generally need to 
borrow money to make these unlawful payments.  Dowry payments in rural Bangladesh can 
range from 20,000-50,000 taka ($200-$500), a significantly high amount given the average 
daily earnings are between100-200 taka ($1-$2).  One respondent, describing a fellow 
borrower’s microfinance loan, stated:  
His motivation for doing this was to raise money for his daughter‘s marriage. He 
has now become a loan defaulter because instead of investing all his borrowings in 
agriculture, he spent a lot of the money on his daughter‘s wedding. He borrowed 
240,000 taka from NGOs, relatives and neighbors and paid an average of 35% 
interest on the loans for the cultivation season of 2007-2008. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Borrowing money to make dowry payments was a recurring theme in our data and 
most families used microfinance loans to defray marriage expenses of their daughter.  Dowry 
payments and extended borrowing from microfinance institutions also increased landlessness 
as borrowers had to sell of their land to repay loans used for dowry payments.  There is some 
evidence that suggests that there has been an increase in the size of dowry payments in rural 
Bangladesh due to the additional financial resources provided by microcredit (Rozario, 2002).   
We also found evidence of fraught relationships between the NGOs that provided 
microfinance and borrowers. NGOs often employed aggressive loan recovery tactics that 
exacerbated feelings of social vulnerability. The characteristics of the social relationships and 
solidarity circles that existed in the extended family units were used by microfinance providers 
to ensure repayment of loans by shaming people in front of their extended family members.  
One farmer described how a representative from an NGO arrived at a funeral to collect 
debts: 
His dead body was in front of the house and the family was shedding tears at his 
sudden death. In the meantime, the field representative (for the NGO) was asking 
to pay the dead man’s loan and suggesting that the relatives collect the money for 
him. Then the people get very angry and he left. He came back after one week 
and the relatives continued his loan. (I; R&RA) 
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One woman who was unable to repay her loan said: 
 
When we can’t pay the NGO enter our house to see if they can take anything. 
Once they took my only water bucket.  And my sheelnoda (mortar and pestle).  
They say once I repay the loan they will return it. Once they even brought police 
to my house. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Patterns emerging from the data indicate that financial relationships have traditionally 
been established primarily through bounded solidarity and the close ties of informal social 
networks and family.  In the absence of many formal financial structures, poor communities 
and families rely heavily on social connections and social capital to develop financial solutions 
that protect against risk and vulnerability (Matin et al., 2002).  However, the social 
relationships within families have changed due to the different demands of reciprocity from 
having to repay micro loans that were taken out by families through their female members.  
Our analysis indicates that reciprocity and solidarity in traditional financial exchanges has 
been transformed in the context of microfinance: using bounded solidarity as collateral 
actually diminished bounded solidarity by fostering a surveillance culture and eroding trust.  
Table III lists illustrative quotes that reflect the social vulnerability of the communities in our 
study. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table III around here 
------------------------------------- 
  
Environmental vulnerability: The Matlab region, like much of the rest of the country, is 
frequently affected by natural disasters such as annual floods, river erosion and cyclones.  
Farmers are experiencing shorter planting and harvesting cycles as a result of frequent floods.  
The introduction of cash crops such as maize in the region to replace traditional off-season 
crops like mustard and potato was a direct intervention by microfinance institutions like 
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BRAC to provide opportunities for income generation.  NGOs and microfinance institutions 
are also key players in the supply chain of maize production:  not only do they provide 
microfinance to encourage maize cultivation; they also provide seeds for trial purposes as an 
incentive.  Maize cultivation was heavily promoted by the MFIs in the region and several 
farmers took out additional loans from microfinance providers in an attempt to grow maize to 
generate income.  According to our participants, the loans granted for growing maize by the 
microfinance institutions were sometimes contingent on the purchase of maize seeds.  NGOs 
offer incentives of new loans to female borrowers if they trial maize and buy the maize seed 
from the NGO.  A female member of the household who had taken out a micro loan so that 
her husband could switch to maize told us:       
I requested the NGOs to give me 20,000 taka loan last year but they did not. This 
year they saw my son grow maize and see maize stocked in my premise, now they 
are happy to give me loan. The NGOs will give more money if you grow maize. 
Even the NGOs have their own maize seeds. My in-laws told me that NGOs give 
high amount of loan if their seed is grown. (I; R&RA) 
 
Our findings indicate that traditional farming practices, barter exchange and traditional 
forms of financial dealings in the villages are being increasingly challenged by attempts of 
many farmers to grow maize for profit.  Crop failure is common because farmers are not 
provided training for the necessary farming techniques, and/or the weather conditions are 
generally unsuitable.  Many community members are borrowing from NGOs and relatives 
beyond their capacity to repay, hoping to use their maize crop profits to pay off the loans.  
Some farmers expressed concern that the farming practices many have adopted in order to 
farm cash crops of maize are unsustainable in the longer term because they deplete nutrients 
from the soil and also require increasing amounts of expensive fertilizer each season.  NGOs 
even offer fertilizer for sale to support maize cultivation.  For instance, BRAC owns two seed 
production plants and dominates the hybrid seed market in Bangladesh (Kelly, 2012).  Table 
IV lists illustrative quotes that reflect the environmental vulnerability of the communities in 
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our study.  We do not claim that microfinance is responsible for all the environmental 
vulnerabilities faced by communities in our sample.  Obviously threats from climate change, 
droughts and floods are part of a larger ecological system.  However, aggressive promotion by 
MFIs for cultivating of non-traditional cash crops without understanding the environmental 
consequences and without providing adequate education and training can result in 
environmental vulnerabilities and threats to sustainable farming. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table IV around here 
------------------------------------- 
 Economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities are not independent but related to 
each other and in our study we found that lending practices of NGOs operating as MFIs 
worsened these vulnerabilities.  In the next section we discuss how these dimensions are inter-
related and what outcomes arise from their interactions. 
 
Discussion  
Market based vulnerabilities and erosion of social capital 
Our ethnographic study builds a grounded theory of the vulnerability and social 
capital dimensions of poverty arising from microfinance activity.  Our narratives explain how 
vulnerabilities and powerlessness arising from poverty are exacerbated and why communities 
living in extreme poverty are unable to escape the poverty trap through microfinance.  In 
developing an asset vulnerability framework, Moser (1998) identified labor, human capital 
(health, skills and education), productive assets, household relations and social capital as key 
assets that determine the extent of vulnerability.  Our findings indicate that increased 
economic, social and environmental vulnerabilities arising from microfinance loans adversely 
affected both economic and social assets of the communities in the study.  Inability to repay 
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loans eroded the assets of the communities and led to poor health outcomes while 
undermining household relations and social capital.   
According to Moser (1998: 3) vulnerabilities involve both sensitivity (the magnitude of 
a system’s response to an external event) and resilience (the ease and rapidity of a system’s 
recovery from stress).  Market induced vulnerability increased the risks of poor communities 
falling further into poverty by influencing both sensitivity and resilience in the communities 
we studied.  Inability to repay loans increased insecurity of borrowers as they found 
themselves in an inescapable debt spiral.  In addition, the social capital of these communities, 
which was a key resource in coping with poverty, was undermined through aggressive loan 
recovery tactics, thus adversely affecting the resilience of these communities to recover from 
economic stress.  We found that individuals and families experienced a sense of helplessness, 
which often accompanies economic stress (Moser, 1998) and which reduced the capacity to 
mobilize resources to cope with hazards (Watts and Bohle, 1993) as well as deprived 
capabilities of individuals to participate in economic activity or political processes leading to 
what Amartya Sen (1985) describes as the ‘politics of hope and despair’.  
We also found that NGOs who were the main service providers in the region 
contributed to deteriorating social relations in the community through their aggressive loan 
recovery tactics that created a ‘culture of shame’ (Karim, 2008) by targeting women who 
were blamed for bringing shame to their husbands and families.  Rather than building social 
solidarity, group lending had the opposite effect because each woman borrower was 
responsible for repayment of all other individual loans.  Fear of potential defaults by members 
of their ‘solidarity circle’ created a mechanism of surveillance that diminished relations of 
reciprocity and trust and broke down group relations and family relations.   
Borrowing from microfinance providers eroded social capital in two ways.  First, 
aggressive repayment tactics from lenders involved public shaming of defaulters that 
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adversely affected their social ties both with the community and with their family members. 
The ‘solidarity groups’ that were the basis of the social collateral of microfinance loans thus 
led to an erosion of bonding social capital.  Second, access to microfinance loans did not 
create new bridging capital in the sense that while individuals had access to credit, the loans 
did not result in income generating activities but further increased indebtedness of 
households.  In fact, following Bourdieu (1986) we found that microfinance activity resulted in 
negative social capital due to erosion of bonding capital without any creation of bridging 
capital.  In addition, as highlighted earlier bridging social capital contributed to a 
reproduction of inequality whereby a respected community member and group leader used 
her relationship with the external microfinance network to obtain loans for other members of 
her family.  Thus, the availability of microfinance did not increase structural social capital 
from new network configurations but instead eroded relational social capital by undermining 
existing relations of trust, reciprocity and cooperation (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).   
 
Implications, limitations and future directions 
So how can researchers use our work?  Our attempt to build a grounded theory of the 
vulnerability dimensions of poverty contributes to theories of building inclusive markets.  
Research on how BoP approaches can address social and environmental issues is growing 
rapidly.  However, much of this research is based on case studies and theoretical development 
is still in its infancy.  BoP proponents claim that ‘the greater the ability of the venture to meet 
the needs of the poor, the greater the economic return to the venture’, but acknowledge that 
this ‘exciting hypothesis requires more comprehensive testing to better understand the 
interactions and boundary conditions in the relationship between profits and poverty 
alleviation’ (London, 2009:11).  Our findings highlight the limits of BoP approaches to 
poverty reduction and create theoretical spaces that can allow future research to investigate 
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the boundary conditions of entrepreneurship policies that could have detrimental 
consequences (Hall et al., 2012). 
Much of the focus of the BoP literature has been on level of investments rather than 
on the social and economic value of these investments to poor communities.  In their analysis 
of BoP initiatives Ansari et al. (2012: 818) call for a ‘grounded understanding of how poverty 
stricken communities survive’ to understand whether BoP initiatives create or destroy social 
welfare.  Our study provides such a grounded understanding and our findings indicate that 
microfinance as a BoP strategy increased vulnerability risks of the extreme poor in the three 
villages that we studied.  More research is needed to understand the relationship between 
microfinance and vulnerability risks in other contexts.  ‘Co-creation’, ‘partnerships with local 
communities’, ‘creating markets for virtue’ are key concepts in the BoP and CSR literatures 
(Brès and Gond, 2013).  Our findings indicate these partnerships continue to exclude people 
who are the recipients of poverty alleviation programs and we argue that if poor communities 
become real partners in development the value propositions of these programs will undergo a 
major transformation because they will be defined based on the needs of the poor, not on 
markets for microfinance. 
Our findings also contribute to research that explores the role of social capital in 
poverty alleviation.  For instance, in the theoretical framework developed by Ansari et al. 
(2012) social capital can develop capabilities in BoP segments by distributing capabilities 
within groups through bonding social capital and transferring capabilities between groups 
through bridging social capital.  Our study of economic, social and environmental 
vulnerabilities provides key insights on the processes that hinder the development of 
capabilities and instead create new vulnerabilities.  More research is needed on the negative 
aspects of social capital – for instance, the conditions that enable individuals to increase their 
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own power and resource access as well as the conditions that can erode bonding social 
capital. 
Our findings also contribute to the emerging literature on building inclusive markets 
by providing a micro-level account from the perspective of the target population.  In many 
ways we provide the ‘other side’ of the picture in the important work done by Mair et al. 
(2012) on building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh by drawing on the experiences of 
people that are being included in the global financial services system.  In their study of 
BRAC’s operations in rural Bangladesh Mair et al. (2012: 827) found that the NGO filled an 
‘institutional void’ in the region by focusing on ‘local means of issue resolution’ and ‘making 
use of customary sources of social support’.  Our study can be seen as a counter narrative to 
the NGO narrative seen from the perspective of the receivers of microfinance.  Using 
traditional social networks may well allow NGOs to fill institutional voids but they do not 
address the longer-term consequences of increasing debt burdens and the economic, social 
and environmental vulnerabilities that we identified.  Traditional forms of reciprocal 
exchange among family and extended family members are being overlaid with an increasing 
number of market based financial exchanges with NGOs based not on trust but associated 
more with expediency and a short term need for cash.  Little consideration is being given by 
borrowers to longer-term consequences about how the loans will be repaid. 
Another implication of our findings is that in addition to economic indicators such as 
access and cost effectiveness, microfinance programs should be assessed by qualitative 
indicators of vulnerability and risk as identified in our study.  Better social and economic 
outcomes could be achieved if social investment was directed at initiatives aimed at reducing 
risk and vulnerability such as building hospitals or schools, investing in building and 
supporting local businesses to provide employment and a steady income all year round for 
family members, or investing in social movements for fair and equitable access to land for 
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farming.  The target populations of poverty reduction programs must play a key role in 
developing and running programs like financial cooperatives, credit unions, local 
development banks, and farmers’ societies.  Alternatives to profit-driven, ‘new wave’ 
microfinance models are emerging from other parts of the world such as the Mondragon 
model in Spain, Self Help Groups and Neighborhood Help Groups as well as farmers’ 
cooperatives in the Indian state of Kerala (Bateman, 2011).  The key difference between these 
models and the microfinance model lies in their collectivist approach as opposed to the 
individual entrepreneur focus of microfinance models.  Both models use social solidarity of 
poor communities to promote empowerment, the difference being that collective approaches 
use solidarity as a means for collective production whereas microfinance relies on social 
pressure from the community to compel individuals to repay loans (Bateman, 2011).  More 
research is needed to understand the conditions that can enable social solidarities to reduce 
vulnerabilities and achieve different outcomes. 
Lastly, more research is needed to understand how microfinance influences the role of 
women in poor rural regions in developing countries.  While it is true that giving loans to 
women is changing long held cultural and social practices as more women involve themselves 
in farming activities to support their families, it would be unwise to infer that patriarchal 
structures are declining as a result.  As we saw earlier the loans taken out by women 
invariably were given to their husbands or male family members.  Increase in dowry 
payments as a result of the availability of microfinance, which is what our study and others 
have found, certainly does not reflect any level of ‘empowerment’ among women.  
Our study has some limitations.  We do not claim that microfinance does not provide 
any benefits to poor populations or that our findings are generalizable to all poor 
communities that are recipients of microfinance.  Rather our aim is to generalize our findings 
into theory – in this case, theories of vulnerability and social capital in the context of poverty.  
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It is reasonable to ask what would the situation have been if no microfinance was available?  
Would individuals have been pushed further into poverty?  Randomized trials and field 
experiments with economic, social and environmental indicators are needed to answer this 
question but such studies are rare given the challenges of conducting these types of studies in 
rural areas of the developing world (Kent and Dacin, 2013). 
Given that our respondents were all receivers of microfinance loans there is a 
possibility of response bias.  Our recruitment methods were partly dependent on the input 
from local community leaders and there was a possibility that vested interests among local 
NGOs or administrators could have influenced the selection of participants and skewed the 
findings.  In an attempt to minimize such bias we relied on local research assistants who had 
family ties to the villages and had information about the circumstances of the households in 
our sample.  Our findings are also limited by the choice of informants and we did not seek to 
interview government officials, microfinance providers and NGOs.  Rather, our focus was on 
eliciting narratives about poor people’s experiences with microfinance.  
In his analysis of development Crush (1995: 5) raised some key questions:  ‘The texts 
of development have always been avowedly strategic and tactical—promoting, licensing, and 
justifying certain interventions and practices, delegitimizing others . . . What do the texts of 
development not say? What do they suppress? Who do they silence—and why?’  Perhaps 
these questions can serve as a starting point for asking the big questions about inclusive 
capitalism and development.  If impoverished communities are to be empowered we need to 
provide opportunities for chronically poor communities to tell their own stories about their 
real situations and discuss their real needs.  We can start to empower them by listening. 
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Sample Focus Groups Interviews 
Village A 1 female group with 6 participants 
1 male group with 6 participants 
20 (5 females 
and 15 males) 
Village B 1 female group with 10 participants 18 (13 females 
and 5 males) 
Village C 1 female group with 8 participants 
1 male group with 6 participants 
1 male group with 7 participants 
16 (12 females 
and 4 males) 
Local Research 
Associates 
 1 female 
1 male 
Follow up field 
visit 
1focus group with 8 housewives and 3 husbands 17 (11 males 
and 6 females) 
TOTAL 7 focus groups 73 interviews 
 
Table I 
Sample Groups 
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Economic 
Vulnerability 
Social 
Vulnerability 
Environmental 
Vulnerability 
Rising 
indebtedness 
Surveillance 
Disempowerment 
 
Shaming 
Loss of land 
assets 
Shifting 
cultivation 
patterns 
Aggregate 
theoretical 
dimensions 
Second order 
constructs
First order 
codes 
Consumption smoothing 
Availability of microcredit 
Multiple loans  
 
Inability to pay 
No collateral 
Solidarity Circles 
Individuals responsible for default 
by others 
Loans for maize cultivation 
Providing seeds 
High fertilizer costs 
Lack of proper training 
Aggressive loan recovery tactics 
Confiscation of property  
 
Strained social relations 
Family breakdowns 
Dowry payments 
 
Figure 1 
 
Analysis Scheme 
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Rising Indebtedness 
 
Loss of Land Assets 
 
Farmer 1: Cannot afford to have proper meal each day. 
Need to rely on others for food. Despite hunger, I had to 
pay instalments NGO will never care why I can’t pay. (I; 
RA). 
 
Woman 7: Say, you can collect some of the vegetable 
(leaves) from the roadside and eat (cook) them, that money 
you pay to the NGO like this. (FG; R&RA). 
  
Woman 11: They ask about: what you do with this 
money -We tell them whatever they want to know -We 
have several loans, we borrow form one and pay to others 
-We have few loans -when we are in deep trouble, borrow 
10-20,000tks, we eat less and pay back. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Woman 9: I had to tell lie to the agents for borrowing. If 
I tell them about the true reason then they will not give me 
loan. The true reason of borrowing money is to pay other 
loan that I had borrowed from other NGOs. (I; R&RA)    
 
Woman 3: I had borrowed the money for 
agriculture specifically for cultivating maize. At 
present, I have no source of income. My husband 
was a rickshaw puller, his rickshaw got stolen 
since then he is unemployed. Whenever we need 
cash, we need to borrow because our daily or 
regular income is very low. I have not benefitted 
much from the loans because the crops were not as 
good as expected. So, we are not being able to repay 
the loans. If we want to restart, we will have to 
loan again. Oh, the loans have become burden to 
us. (I; R&RA) 
 
Woman 12: Every baree (household) took loans 
from NGOs. Not a single household has any 
earnings to pay it back. (FG; R&RA) 
Farmer 2:Took loan from Bru-tangail, 20000 
taka, 550/week, 40 weeks. Agrani Bank, gave 
land document three years back, 12000 taka, 
still need to pay, interest is increasing, have to sell 
land, always on loan, no peace to farmers. (FG; 
R&RA)  
 
Farmer 3: I had to sacrifice my land to pay the 
loan but I can spend few good days if I borrow. 
(I; R&RA) 
 
Farmer 4: These NGOs are not good for us, our 
poverty level is increasing but we have no other 
option. Does not matter if you die you have to pay 
the instalment or sell house or land? The poverty 
is becoming “boundary-less”. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Farmer 3: My in-law in Daudkandi has lost all 
his land because he borrowed too much from 
many sources. Last year, he made huge loss due to 
bad weather and storm. He had sold all his land 
to pay the loan. He is still in huge debt. It is 
impossible to pay loan growing crops. (FG; 
R&RA)  
 
Woman 14: I used to have a house and some 
land. My husband fell sick. Used the loan for 
medicine.  Couldn't repay. Now we lost house 
and land.  I live in my sister’s place and work in 
her house. (I; R&RA) 
 
 
Table II 
Economic Vulnerability 
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Table III 
Social Vulnerability 
Surveillance 
 
Disempowerment   
 
Shaming 
 
Respondent 1: My cousin died. 
NGO people came to me and told 
me to pay the money on behalf of 
the deceased person as he cannot 
pay. They watch and try to find 
out who in the family can pay. 
(FG; R&RA) 
 
Respondent 2: The NGO workers 
never pay heed to whatever 
problems you may have ...they 
demand and recover the instalment 
amounts by hook-or-by crook if 
necessary they will make you 
borrow from relatives. to pay back 
the instalment. Despite hunger, I 
had to pay instalments. NGO will 
never care why I can't pay. (I; 
R&RA) 
 
Farmer 5: We can trick them 
(NGOs) by not staying at home 
when they come to collect money 
but the female has to stay at home, 
so they catch them. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Woman 12: The men run away 
when NGOs come to collect money.  
They know we women are in the 
house.  They stay till it is dark so 
they can catch the men when they 
come home. 
 
Woman 5: When we can’t pay the 
NGO enter our house to see if they 
can take anything. Once they took 
my only water bucket.  And my 
sheelnodi (mortar and pestle).  
They say once I repay the loan they 
will return it. Once they even 
brought police to my house. (FG; 
R&RA) 
Woman 4: We are dying out of 
this vice (dowry). We cry for the 
money spent on the marriage, don’t 
cry for our daughter's being sent 
off. Suppose, I need to get my  
daughter married.  I have to 
borrow money 10,000 to 
20,000tk.  Marriage ceremony 
lasts for two days - need lots of 
money. Need to spend a lot, don't 
cry if mother dies, but cry for 
daughter’s marriage, give everything 
to daughter. Sacrifice life for 
daughter’s marriage. (FG; 
R&RA) 
 
Woman 4:  For a granddaughter’s 
wedding we borrowed, tk 30,000 
cash and 10 grams of gold. 
Another one, tk 20,000 in cash 
and 5 grams of gold. Have to 
marry off the girls, otherwise the 
husbands will harass them, there 
will be unrest. No peace. Have to 
pay in the hands of father in law, 
not the groom. Otherwise there is 
social conflict. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Farmer 1: I had to give 
marriage to my daughter 
and need money. I borrowed 
too much. Now I have huge 
loss. But I had to give 
marriage to my daughter. (I; 
R&RA) 
 
Woman 19: So this credit will 
destroy the culture and country, 
everybody is concerned about 
increasing borrowing but never 
think of earning. (I; R&RA) 
 
 
Male, Rickshaw driver: NGO 
should not use bad words to the 
housewife in front of other 
neighbours. They come in every 
Mondays and Wednesdays to 
collect weekly payment. If you ask 
for extension they get very angry 
and use bad language. This is 
shame to me and my family, when 
the toll collectors keep sitting in my 
home for the whole day and use 
bad language. I am a human and I 
cannot drive rickshaw the whole 
day. I had to borrow from others to 
pay these immediate payments. (I; 
R&RA) 
 
Woman 17: My father borrowed 
money from NGOs to help my 
husband, and now they are also in 
trouble. They are losing their face 
too. (I; R&RA) 
 
Woman 11: Often they take us to 
their NGO office and make us sit 
there all day.  Showing us in front 
of villagers.  It is kind of insult 
and shame. We lose face. 
 
Woman 7: The NGOs money is 
must pay money. Even though we 
don’t give collateral to NGOs 
against borrowing, but their 
swearing in front of other villagers 
makes you to pay the instalment in 
each week. 
 
The NGO people swear using my 
mother’s name. It is too dirty and 
shameful. (I; R&RA) 
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Climate Change Impacts 
 
Shifting Cultivation Patterns 
 
Farmer 1: The winter season is becoming shorter and 
shorter. We have had rain water logging since late 
October that has remained still till this early 
November, but look now, it is late November, 
supposed to be prime winter, but can you feel any 
cold………potato needs chilling cold, otherwise it 
won’t get enough food. 
  
Look at me I am wearing only a shirt on a winter 
morning and it is 9 in the morning. You will never get 
a good yield of potato if the winter is not cold enough. 
If I have to plant potato in December then when will I 
harvest maize? It will be all rainy and cloudy by the 
time of maize harvest, all too difficult to dry maize 
then. (FG; RA) 
 
Farmer 2 Village C All we can do is pray to God to 
stop this devastating air, I have lost huge yields 
because of it, and it is increasing every year. 
Agriculture is no longer the simple way of life. You 
have to have sufficient cash in hand. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Farmer 4: The potato-maize is good combination but 
it requires high level of chemical fertilizer. Yes, we are 
giving sufficient fertilizer, but long maize root takes 
much natural nutrition from the soil. This condition is 
pushing us to apply more fertilizer next year. The 
great danger of this practice is that there will be no 
natural nutrition in the soil. We have to fully rely on 
chemical fertilizer. (FG; R&RA) 
Retired farmer: The young farmers only know want to 
make money. They have been growing potato-maize 
every year. It takes high level of nutrition from the soil 
and left very little for the next crop. Every year they 
are applying more fertilizer. God forbids there will be 
no rice grown in this soil. (FG; R&RA) 
Farmer 1: There will always be the natural disaster, 
hot wind and high price of fertilizer. These will cause 
loss in potato crop, and it will be so high that good 
maize will not recover the loss. I don’t know why they 
are doing this. They are not farmers, and I really do 
wonder why they are taking huge loan. (FG: R&RA) 
Farmer 2: This year many families have taken new 
loan from new NGOs. Farmer 3 owns no land, and 
has rented 1 acre and trialled growing maize. Too 
expensive at the end, 700 tk kg seed, most of the 
farmers got lower yield. Last year the price of maize 
crop was higher than rice so people selected to grow 
maize for the first time. This simple calculation, 
many farmers follow that (grew maize for the first 
time) made a terrible loss and lost everything, due to 
bad weather and less demand. (FG; R&RA) 
 
Table IV 
Environmental Vulnerability 
